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Political Activity and Firm Performance within Nonmarket 
Research: A Review and International Comparative Assessment 
Abstract 
There is a widely held view that the performance of firms depends not only on the ability of 
managers to exploit economic markets but also on their ability to succeed in political 
markets. To test the value of political activism, recent scholarship has probed the impact of 
CPA on firm performance. However, mixed findings and the fragmented nature of the field 
raise more questions than provide answers to the nature of this relationship. This systematic 
review examines scholarly articles for evidence of the impact of CPA on firm value. The 
findings suggest that CPA is more valuable in emerging countries. Relational strategies 
dominate in emerging countries where social capital underlies political and economic 
exchange. The paucity of studies on informational strategies and policy outcomes in the 
emerging country context indicates that firms’ focus on institutional entrepreneurship and 
global governance is poor. Consequently, we consider the implications of the findings for 
local and multinational enterprises, and proffer suggestions for further research. 
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1. Introduction 
In the wake of increased global competition, managers are constantly seeking ways to 
enhance the competitive advantage of their firms. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are 
expanding into emerging markets which despite being risky environments (Henisz & Zelner, 
2010) have abundant opportunities. Exploitation of market prospects in these locations 
requires the management of political risks (Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Puck, Rogers, & Mohr, 
2013). Even in developed markets, there is the need for firms in search of competitive 
advantage to manage political uncertainty (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Firms’ interactions with 
their nonmarket environments do not only improve their transparency and corporate 
governance practices, but also offer opportunities to shape the opinions of the public (Griffin 
& Dunn, 2004) and politicians (Doh, Lawton, Rajwani, & Paroutis, 2014; Lawton, Doh, & 
Rajwani, 2014). Hence it is increasingly becoming clearer that marketplace strategy alone is 
difficult to deliver superior firm performance.  
A combination of both market and political strategies has been posited as the ultimate 
integrated strategy that confers sustained competitive advantage on firms (Baron, 1995; 
Lawton, McGuire, & Rajwani, 2013). Consequently, firm performance is dependent on the 
ability of managers to influence their regulatory environments and exploit their economic 
markets (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008; Marsh, 1998). As noted by Schuler (1996), a focus 
on acquiring market resources while neglecting the development of political capital in the 
nonmarket environment could have a negative toll on competitive advantage. Corporate 
political activity (hereafter CPA) has gained prominence in both practice and research as a 
strategy firms use to influence government policy, shape their regulatory space, and drive 
their performance (Getz, 1997; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). The need for firms to 
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participate in the political process is borne out of the daunting reality that almost every firm is 
affected by government regulation and policy (Stigler, 1971).  
In recent times, firms have been described as corporate citizens in nonmarket studies (Matten 
& Crane, 2005; Moon, Crane, & Matten, 2005; Wood & Logsdon, 2008). Corporate 
citizenship describes the political roles that corporations play to solve common problems 
(Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2013). CPA enables firms to participate in political 
processes and contribute to social welfare (Alzola, 2013). In the current trend of 
globalization, corporations play roles and assume larger responsibilities which were and 
continue to be regarded as the sole responsibilities of governments (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2007). From the advocacy for appropriate laws and regulations (Neron & Norman, 2008) to 
the sponsorship or endorsement of “best political candidates” (Alzola, 2013), the contribution 
of CPA to global governance cannot be undermined.  
The underlying rationale for CPA is to improve the fortunes of the firm (Schuler, Rehbein, & 
Cramer, 2002). In other words, it is intended to provide firms with access to the corridors of 
political power (Keim & Zeithaml, 1986), reduce uncertainty (Hillman & Hitt, 1999), and 
subsequently empower them with the ability to influence their competitive space (Capron & 
Chatain, 2008; McWilliams, van Fleet, & Cory, 2002). However, a scan of extant literature 
across a broad international spectrum reveals that evidence of the relationship between CPA 
and firm performance is still mixed. While some studies report a positive relationship 
between political activism and performance, other studies report the absence of a significant 
relationship or even a negative relationship. Hence, our knowledge of the impact of CPA on 
firm performance is not complete or conclusive.  
Building on the special issue call for more research on ‘global governance and international 
nonmarket strategies’ in the International Business (IB hereafter) field, we find that CPA 
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research in emerging and developing countries is gaining momentum, but findings show it 
requires more focus around outcomes.  More importantly, these activities show it is not 
regulated or recorded well in some of these continents i.e. Africa, South America and Asia. 
These emerging markets, though fraught with high level political risks (Henisz & Zelner, 
2010), provide abundant investment opportunities for international firms. Weak regulatory 
regimes (Henisz, 2004) among a number of other institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000) render developing countries as high risk. Consequently, the reduction of political risk 
exposure is one of the main motivations for political activity (Hillman & Hitt, 1999), 
especially for international firms (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003; Keillor, Wilkinson, & Owens, 
2005). Few studies (Puck et al., 2013) have assessed the impact of political activity on risk 
exposure of multinationals in emerging countries. This is a slice of a larger deficiency in the 
IB literature where there is relative paucity of studies exploring CPA outcomes for 
multinational enterprises in different emerging markets (MNEs) from different home 
countries (Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013).  
The IB field has explored various CPA factors, but much of the focus has been on the nature 
of MNE political behaviour (Barron, 2011; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Hillman & Keim, 
1995; Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010), the determinants of MNE political strategies 
(Blumentritt, 2003; Hillman, 2003; Hillman & Wan, 2005), and MNE political strategy 
process (Chen, 2007; Luo & Zhao, 2013). The performance implications of CPA for MNEs 
lag behind the pack. Nonetheless, a few studies have attempted to compare performance of 
politically active firms across multiple countries (Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2008; 
Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, & Saffar, 2012; Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2012; Faccio, 
2006). Though this approach does not address international business in its purest sense, it 
does hint at some of the important relationships between institutional environments and CPA 
outcomes. Such findings cast light on the value of CPA in different regions and provide a 
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basis for MNEs to plan and vary their political engagement in diverse institutional 
environments. We believe that reviewing a large body of IB, finance, economics and political 
science literatures, we will reveal the nuances of the strategies, mechanisms, and outcomes of 
political engagement in different institutional contexts, and provide deeper insight for MNE 
strategic planning.  
Therefore, this paper makes three distinct contributions to the CPA field, and more broadly to 
the IB field. Firstly, it examines, in an objective and structured manner, the empirical 
evidence regarding the impact of CPA on firm performance in different international 
contexts. Due to the fragmented and inconsistent nature of the literature, we synthesized the 
information following the CIMO-logic (Denyer, Tranfield, & van Aken, 2008) as applied by 
Pilbeam, Alvarez, & Wilson (2012). This method relates to the design science paradigm 
where the focus is on improving outcomes through the implementation of appropriate 
interventions. Design propositions are prescriptive (Denyer et al., 2008) and are able to 
provide information on what to do under what circumstances to achieve what outcomes 
(Pilbeam et al., 2012). By this synthesis method, we explored the contexts (C) within which 
CPA has been investigated, the strategies/interventions (I) implemented, the firm 
performance outcomes (O) of those strategies, and the mechanisms (M) underlying the 
performance outcomes. Thereafter, we combined these four elements to derive a whole 
picture. We chose this explanatory and realist method of synthesis (Pilbeam et al., 2012) in 
order to understand how CPA strategies and outcomes vary in different contexts, and also to 
understand what mechanisms impact performance. The assumption made here is that 
different CPA strategies may produce different outcomes in different contexts through 
different mechanisms. Thus, we build on other important CPA reviews (Hillman et al., 2004; 
Lawton et al., 2013; Mathur & Singh, 2011) which mainly summarized CPA research without 
delving deep into any of the facets of CIMO. We provide depth in understanding the impact 
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of CPA on firm performance and being the first study to do so applying the CIMO-logic and 
using a systematic approach for paper selection (Denyer et al., 2008).  
Our second contribution is in developing the future agenda on how to investigate the CPA 
and performance relationship in the IB field.  There is a need to systematically review the 
current literature to create even more clarity. That way, we will not only reach conclusive 
evidence as to the nature of the CPA-firm performance relationship, but will also identify 
possible and optimal avenues to contribute to the topic by way of further research (Grant & 
Booth, 2009; Tranfield, Denyer, & Smart, 2003).  The findings suggest that CPA is positively 
related to firm performance, an indication that there is value in political activity. Majority of 
the studies we find argue that CPA improves firm performance. However, counter evidence is 
also reported by a few studies in both developed and emerging markets. The evidence also 
reveals that institutional contexts influence the political strategies used by firms, the 
performance outcomes of those strategies, and the mechanisms through which those 
strategies impact performance outcomes. Even though most of the studies lack theoretical 
grounding, social capital, cronyism and agency relationships are the popularly cited or 
implied mechanisms underlying the CPA-firm performance relationship.  
Finally, our paper has implications for understanding corporate governance aspects in 
international business, as we find that institutional variations moderate the nature and 
efficacy of corporate political engagement. Multinational firms with operations in 
emerging/developing countries and developed countries will realize that some strategies do 
not work and some outcomes are non-existent. The mechanisms influencing firm 
performance also vary with level of institutional development. We argue that CPA, a type of 
capability, can provide solutions to common problems and promote global governance. 
Moreover, it is through institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988), MNEs can transfer 
best these political practices and principles to developing countries.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the methodology employed in this 
study in the next section. A descriptive account of the reviewed literature is also offered. 
Thematic findings are presented following the CIMO-logic (Denyer et al., 2008). These 
findings are subsequently synthesized and discussed. We conclude our review by hinting at 
the implications of the findings for firms, especially MNEs, and suggesting directions for 
future research. 
<Insert Figure 1>  
2. Methods 
The methodology employed in conducting this systematic review followed the approach 
posited by Tranfield et al. (2003) and Petticrew and Roberts (2006). These studies articulate a 
systematic approach to review management and social sciences literature. Prior to beginning 
the review, we carried out a scoping study to “access the size and relevance of literature and 
to delimit the subject area or topic” (Tranfield et al., 2003, p.214), to identify the nature and 
extent of research literature (Grant & Booth, 2009), to identify the current state of 
understanding of the topic (Anderson, Allen, Peckham, & Goodwin, 2008), and to determine 
the value of undertaking a systematic review (Arksey & O'malley, 2005). The scoping 
process required analytical interpretation (Levac, Colquhoun, & O'Brien, 2010) of the 
“theoretical, practical and methodological history debates surrounding the fields and sub-
fields of study” (Tranfield et al., 2003, p.214-215).   
Systematic review is an evidence-based approach which originated from medical sciences 
and healthcare, aimed to improve decision making (Tranfield et al., 2003). In management 
research and social sciences, this approach is a new phenomenon that is yet to gain 
popularity. Management reviews are typically narrative reviews which mostly provide 
descriptive accounts of literature, and they differ significantly from systematic reviews which 
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adopt “a replicable, scientific, and transparent process…” and provide an “audit trail of 
reviewers’ decisions, procedures and conclusions (Tranfield et al., 2003, p. 209). Hence 
systematic reviews attempt to reduce reviewer bias as much as possible so as to provide a 
critical account of evidence. They ensure rigour and transparency, and minimize the 
weaknesses inherent in traditional narrative reviews (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006; Tranfield et 
al., 2003). Systematic review techniques reduce bias and subjectivity (Tranfield et al., 2003). 
They allow for a more holistic picture, and they facilitate the identification of common, 
general, and conclusive evidence (Tranfield et al., 2003). Unlike systematic reviews, 
traditional narrative reviews are “singular” accounts (Tranfield et al., 2003) and are not 
conclusive due to conflicting information and difficulty to determine a balance of the 
evidence (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). Systematic reviews may help advance theory by 
providing opportunities to challenge existing knowledge and established schools of thoughts 
(Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). 
2.1 Search Strategy 
The search strategy used in this review comprised the identification of keywords, terms and 
phrases which we built from the literature. We initially searched two databases for articles 
from which we further identified articles through cross-referencing. There are two constructs 
in the review question. These are 1) corporate political strategies, and 2) firm performance. 
There are three dominant categories of CPA strategies in the literature namely: 1) financial, 
2) relational, and 3) informational strategies. Drawing on several important and seminal 
studies, we identified the different terms, keywords and phrases used to describe CPA and 
firm performance. Search strings were created through a combination of the identified search 
terms or phrases shown. Three search strings were created for each of the three sub-domains 
of corporate political activity while a single string was created for firm performance. Each of 
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the strings for CPA was combined with the string for firm performance, resulting in three 
different combinations as shown in Table 1. Keyword searches were initially restricted to 
titles and abstracts. 
<Insert Table 1> 
2.2 Databases 
Following the methodology of Pittaway, Robertson, Munir, Denyer, & Neely (2004), de 
Menezes and Kelliher (2011), and Lawton et al. (2013), we searched the databases 
ABI/Inform and EBSCO. These databases are very comprehensive and they index a vast 
amount of business literature. Even though there is a degree of overlap between the two, it 
was still worthwhile to search both just in case any one of them missed out on a publication. 
An additional way we identified literature for this review was through cross referencing. The 
articles that were found from the databases were checked for relevant references. Table 2 
summarizes the search output from the databases. 
<Insert Table 2> 
2.3 Selection of Articles 
Operationalizing the search strings resulted in 2,454 articles. To ensure that only relevant 
papers are reviewed, the articles were scrutinized in a four-stage process based on pre-
determined criteria. First, we scrutinized titles to identify those that had a relation with the 
review question. Second we screened abstracts to identify papers that contained relevant 
themes. An inclusion/exclusion criterion was applied in these first two stages. Third, we 
scrutinized full text of the papers to confirm the presence of themes relevant to the review 
question. Finally, we applied the quality criteria to appraise and select the reviewed articles. 
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 After selecting papers based on titles, abstract and full text, these papers were appraised for 
quality. All relevant papers had to meet our quality appraisal criteria (see Appendix A) in 
order to proceed to the review stage. CPA research is nascent but is spread across journals 
with different rankings. In order not to fall into the trap of assuming that papers in top rated 
journals are necessarily good, journal ranking was not considered in the quality appraisal 
criteria. All criteria were scored from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely). A minimum score of 3 
in relation to each criterion was applied to select the papers that made it to the final sample. 
The search and evaluation process, summarized in Table 3, resulted in a final sample of 56 
articles. 
<Insert Table 3> 
Relevant data from all 56 articles were extracted to a standardized data extraction form 
designed to capture the methods and key findings in the literature (see Appendix C) and to 
develop the CIMO-framework (see Appendix D). Because of the diversity of the individual 
papers with regards to contexts, strategies, mechanisms and performance outcomes, broad 
categories were developed for each element in the CIMO framework. The selected articles 
come from 37 different journals and this to a certain extent indicates how fragmented the 
research on this particular review question is. Some of these journals belong to the IB field, 
but also different fields including politics, economics, finance, management, accounting, and 
public policy. This observation is however not surprising because CPA is a relevant 
phenomenon in all of the aforementioned research fields. Of all 37 journals, only six are 
traceable to the management field and this signals the paucity and nascence of CPA research 
in this domain. Finance and economics journals dominate, perhaps due to the fact that the 
review focuses on firm performance. All reviewed articles were published within the last 25 
years, with the earliest article published in 1988. This reveals that the relationship between 
CPA and firm performance started to receive attention in the late 1980s.  
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3. Thematic Findings 
The findings are presented following the CIMO-logic. Accordingly, we first present findings 
on the ‘contexts’ within which the CPA-firm performance relationship has been investigated. 
Second, we address the ‘interventions’ in terms of political strategies that are used by firms. 
Subsequently, we present evidence on the performance ‘outcomes’ of CPA. Finally, we 
explore the ‘mechanisms’ through which CPA strategies impact performance outcomes.   
3.1 Contexts of CPA Research 
3.1.1 Developed Countries  
The value of CPA in developed markets has received some attention in the literature. The 
majority of studies addressing this context have focused on countries such as the United 
States, Germany, Denmark, and Italy. Globalization, competition, and regulation are among 
the most cited or implied motivations of CPA research in these countries. According to 
Hillman et al. (1999), government has the power to define opportunity sets and shape firms’ 
competitive environments. This consequently increases firms’ involvement in policy 
processes in ways that advance their goals (Hillman, 2005) or stifle the competition of their 
rivals, especially foreign firms wanting to enter their markets (Marsh, 1998). The surge in 
competition has motivated firms to acquire political capital (Hersch, Netter, & Pope, 2008), 
an intangible resource that has a positive long-term effect on the fortunes of firms (Hillman, 
2005).  
Globalization has caused trade expansion and opened up new markets. MNEs firms sign 
investment agreements with partners in foreign countries. Some MNEs start greenfield 
investments in foreign countries for which they have to deal with political risk in sovereign 
territories (Puck et al., 2013). MNEs also lobby their home governments for protection from 
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foreign competition (Evans & Sherlund, 2011; Lee & Baik, 2010). These instances raise the 
importance of political activity as a conduit for competitive advantage (Boddewyn & Brewer, 
1994). Firms seeking to increase their competitiveness through expansion into foreign 
markets stand a better chance of participating in government foreign trade missions when 
they make “soft money” donations to politicians (Schuler, Schnietz, & Baggett, 2002). This 
suggests that in as much as MNEs need to influence host government policies in order to 
reduce their political risk exposure, they also need to influence home government 
international trade policies in order to gain access to new and larger markets.  
Indeed, policy influence runs through most of the popular definitions of CPA (Getz, 1997; 
Hillman et al., 2004). As noted by Liebman and Reynolds (2006), campaign contributions are 
able to influence legislation by increasing the likelihood that beneficiary politicians would 
sponsor laws favourable to their contributors. Regulation begets CPA, and this perhaps 
confirms the finding that highly regulated industries are more politically active (Hillman, 
2005; Kim, 2008). Typically in a given year, a large number of issues are formulated into 
policy and this increases uncertainty for firms, culminating in higher transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1985) of doing business. The dependence of firms on external parties creates 
risk and uncertainty which consequently affect their performance (Hillman, 2005).  
From external parties to legal systems, one of the distinctions between developed and 
developing countries lie in the efficacy of legal systems (Henisz & Zelner, 2010) and level of 
corruption (Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). In developed countries where 
there are well-functioning legal systems, CPA is not expected to yield substantive advantage 
due to the legal costs involved in favouring private interests over public interests (Goldman, 
Rocholl, & So, 2009). However, research has shown that there are significant gains in 
political connections in countries with strong institutions (Amore & Bennedsen, 2013). CPA 
is thus valuable across the world; however the channels through which value accrues to 
14 | P a g e  
 
politically connected firms differ from country to country, owing to variations in institutional 
configurations and characteristics (Boubakri et al., 2012; Kim, 2008). 
3.1.2 Emerging Countries 
CPA research has begun to gain prominence in emerging and developing countries, 
especially in South East Asia. Privatization, economic transitions, corruption and other 
institutional lapses are largely the motivating factors for CPA studies in emerging countries. 
Let’s take a look at China. She loosened her stance on communism and began to privatize 
some of her state owned enterprises (SOEs). The government also decentralized SOEs to 
“promote markets and to gradually phase out its central planning function” (Fan, Wong, & 
Zhang, 2007, p. 332). However, the Chinese government still controlled some aspects of the 
privatization process such as the number of companies that can go public, the number of 
shares that can be offered in a year, and the offer price (Francis, Hasan, & Sun, 2009). Some 
articles referred to this as partial privatization because the government still retained control 
(Fan et al., 2007; Tu, Lin, & Liu, 2013). These controls mean that that politically connected 
firms could still benefit from government favours and preferential treatment (Sun, Xu, & 
Zhou, 2011), thus generating research interest in the value of political connections (Peng & 
Luo, 2000; Wu, Wu, Zhou, & Wu, 2012). Typically, privatized firms are expected to be 
independent from government control. In instances where government does not relinquish 
control, conflicting objectives may arise (Boubakri et al., 2008) and the resultant agency 
problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is expected to impact firm performance. Privatized firms 
are perhaps attractive to CPA researchers because of the likelihood that they would still be 
connected to government.   
According to Peng and Luo (2000), most of the CPA research has taken place in western 
countries, but emerging markets have a fascinating context where social capital will more 
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likely compensate for the lack of market supporting institutions. Social capital from informal 
ties with politicians results in political favouritism (Bliss & Gul, 2012) and cronyism 
(Johnson & Mitton, 2003). The absence of strong institutions creates what some researchers 
call “relationship-based capitalism” (Adhikari, Derashid, & Zhang, 2006; Bliss & Gul, 2012; 
Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid, 2006; Sun et al., 2011) where personal connections and ties 
influence policy and determine the market environment. Other studies (Goldman et al., 2009) 
argue that in well-functioning legal systems, economic gains are not expected to accrue to 
politically connected firms because politicians could face legal and political costs if they 
favour firms for private reasons than for public merit. Obviously, institutions affect the 
behaviour of actors in the policy process and influence the magnitude of benefits from CPA 
(Faccio, 2006). Government control of China’s securities market presents distinctive 
institutional features which affect the performance of firms (Francis et al., 2009). Anti-
corruption reforms by the Malaysian government transformed the institutional environment 
and spawned enquiries into whether private gains continued to exist through political 
connections (Imai, 2006). Weak systems of checks and balance are institutional voids that 
allow politicians and firms to extract economic rents and encourage business owners to enter 
politics for private gains (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009). Some of the studies 
examined CPA in high corruption contexts where “social lending” (Khwaja & Mian, 2005) or 
“memo-lending” (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006) are prevalent. Among other reasons, 
Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven (2008) found Brazil an interesting context to examine CPA due 
to its limited level of institutional development.  
 It is worth mentioning that the institutional context affects the type of CPA data collected. In 
countries where laws regulate CPA, data is relatively easier to collect. For instance, the 
availability of campaign finance data in the US facilitates CPA research. Similarly, Claessens 
et al. (2008) are able to investigate CPA in Brazil because Brazilian laws mandate that 
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campaign contributions are recorded. Holistically, studies addressing the emerging markets 
context touch on the many facets of the topic including how institutions shape the nature of 
political activity (Barron, 2011; Hillman & Keim, 1995) and firm performance outcomes 
(Faccio, 2006; Kim, 2008). The search for new evidence and the eagerness for theory 
development and elaboration inspire the adoption of the institutional lens where the emphasis 
is on developing and emerging economies. According to Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani (2012), 
institutional perspectives will have more relevance for CPA research due to the importance of 
emergent economies for international firms. 
In emerging countries, elections are mostly fraught with irregularities and the transition of 
political power from one administration to the other embodies a risk element because of the 
association of policy volatilities with those events. The lack of strong institutions makes these 
emerging countries highly risky (Henisz & Zelner, 2010). Yeh, Shu, & Chiu (2013), who 
consider Taiwan’s 2000 and 2004 elections as external shocks, investigated the outcomes of 
the elections on the performance of connected firms. The bad news about the health of 
Indonesia’s Suharto filtered into the public domain, hinted at a possible political transition 
and threatened the political capital of connected firms (Fisman, 2001). Such events have 
significant implications for firms due to the prevalence of informal business-government ties 
in emerging countries (Adhikari et al., 2006; Francis et al., 2009).  
3.2 Interventions in CPA  
The strategic interventions used by firms to influence their policy environments and sustain 
competitive advantage can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) financial strategies; 2) 
relational strategies; and 3) informational strategies. These strategies are applied in the 
above-discussed contexts for the sole purpose of shaping the competitive space and 
improving firm performance (Hillman et al., 1999).  
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3.2.1 Financial Strategies 
The financial strategies mostly studied in CPA include political action committee (PAC) and 
“soft money” contributions. These tactics are meant to provide financial incentives to 
politicians and enable firms to gain access to decision makers (Witko, 2011). While it may 
seem that PAC contributions and “soft money” mean the same thing, the two are technically 
different (Ansolabehere, Synder, & Ueda, 2004). Soft money contributions are non-candidate 
specific donations from individuals, corporations and special interest groups to political 
parties (Cooper, Gulen, & Ovtchinnikov, 2010). They are for broad party building purposes 
and not for the promotion of specific candidates (Schuler et al., 2002). As noted by Hersch et 
al. (2008), while PAC contributions are made to specific candidates, “soft money” 
contributions are made to political parties. “Soft money” contributions are advantageous 
because they are not highly regulated or restricted, have no caps (Schuler et al., 2002), and 
can be targeted at the executive branch where key policy decisions are evolved. “Soft money” 
contributions were used by firms until the 2000s when it became illegal to make such 
donations (Hadani & Schuler, 2013). Hence, most of the literature on financial strategies 
examines PAC contributions.  
3.2.2 Relational Strategies 
Relational strategy is perhaps the most complex and subjective of all political strategies in the 
reviewed literature. Generally, this strategy concerns firms establishing relationships with 
politicians mostly through co-opting them into corporate boards (Carretta, Farina, Gon, & 
Parisi, 2012; Goldman et al., 2009; Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Hillman, 2005), through 
business executives and top shareholders entering politics (Hillman et al., 1999; Kim, 2008; 
McGuire, Schneeweis, & Naroff, 1988), or through informal relations (Adhikari et al., 2006; 
Fraser et al., 2006). The common construct used here is “political connections” which is 
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defined differently by different researchers. Table 4 presents a summary of some key 
definitions of political connectedness in the literature, and highlights the subjectivity in the 
definition of most relational strategies. 
<Insert Table 4> 
Political connections are a valuable resource (Faccio, 2006; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; 
Niessen & Ruenzi, 2010) which reduce uncertainty (Hillman et al., 1999) and enable firms to 
gain private information about policy (Hadani & Schuler, 2013). These benefits, among 
others, confer a competitive advantage on connected firms over their unconnected peers 
through the process of rent extraction from government (Hassan, Hassan, Mohamad, & Min, 
2012). Relational strategies are the most studied in the reviewed literature; 33 of 56 articles 
solely focus on these strategies. Perhaps, their dominance in the CPA field is attributed to 
their prevalence in most parts of the world.  
3.2.3 Informational Strategies 
Before laws and regulations are passed and implemented, they are first drafted into proposals 
for approval. At this stage, firms and other interest groups are able to make inputs by 
providing specific information about policy preferences to decision makers. According to 
McKay and Webb-Yackee (2007), competing interests battle it out to influence policy 
decisions and agency actions, particularly to instigate the imposition of trade barriers and 
trade protection from foreign competition (Marsh, 1998). Informational strategies include 
lobbying (Lo, 2003), petitions (Marsh, 1998) and comments (McKay & Webb-Yackee, 
2007). From the reviewed articles, these strategies are not targeted at politicians, but at 
government agencies where key policy issues are initiated and drafted into proposals for 
parliamentary and executive approval. Information strategies are the least investigated CPA 
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strategies/interventions, yet these strategies present a stronger force for a move towards 
global governance particularly in developing countries.   
3.3 Outcomes of CPA 
There are three distinct categories of firm performance outcomes. Stock market performance 
entails the measurement of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and Buy-and-Hold abnormal 
returns (BHARS). The popular methodology used to measure this type of firm performance is 
event study. With this method, the reaction of stock markets to political events is 
investigated, and such events include the appointment of politicians to corporate boards 
(Carretta et al., 2012; Goldman et al., 2009; Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Hillman, 2005), the 
sudden death of politicians (Brown, 1996) and the transition of political power 
(Jayachandran, 2006; Yeh et al., 2013). Other stock market performance variables include 
Tobin q (Wu, Wu, & Rui, 2012) and cost of equity (Boubakri et al., 2012).  
Operating performance draws on accounting data contained in annual reports. Various 
variables such as return on sales (ROS) (Fan et al., 2007; Hadani & Schuler, 2013), return on 
investment (ROI) (Mathur & Singh, 2011; Niessen & Ruenzi, 2010), effective tax rates 
(ETR) (Adhikari et al., 2006; Richter, Samphantharak, & Timmons, 2009), cost of debt (Bliss 
& Gul, 2012), leverage (Fraser et al., 2006; Khwaja & Mian, 2005), accruals quality (Chaney, 
Faccio, & Parsley, 2011), return on assets (ROA) (Peng and Luo, 2000), and interest 
revenues (Carretta et al., 2012) have been used to measure operating performance. Operating 
performance variables are “backward looking” and do not capture intangible political capital 
(Hillman, 2005). Hence, they could be misleading. 
As common with previous reviews (Hillman et al., 2004; Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011), the 
impact of interest groups and firms on policy is another outcome of CPA. However policy 
performance, which measures the performance of firms in the policy arena, is the least 
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studied of all the outcomes in the literature. Articles examining this type of outcome either 
study the voting patterns of politicians (Liebman & Reynolds, 2006), the difference between 
proposed and adopted agency rules (McKay & Webb-Yackee, 2007), government bailouts 
(Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006) or the outcomes of petitions (Lee & Baik, 2010; 
Marsh, 1998).  
<Insert Table 5> 
3.3.2 Positive Performance Outcomes 
The reviewed literature suggests that there is a positive relationship between CPA and firm 
performance. 44 of the 56 studies provide evidence to show that CPA adds value to the firm. 
In Malaysia, Adhikari et al. (2006) found that politically connected firms pay lower effective 
taxes than non-connected firms. This finding is consistent with Richter et al. (2009) who 
reported that in the United States, firms which lobby more in a given year pay lower effective 
tax rates in the next year. Wu et al. (2012) also reported similar evidence for China where 
firms with politically connected managers pay lower tax rates. Politically connected firms 
have easier and preferential access to financing (Boubakri et al., 2012; Claessens et al., 2008; 
Fraser et al., 2006; Hassan et al., 2012; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), are highly leveraged 
(Fraser et al., 2006), and have longer debt maturities (Boubakri et al., 2012). Political 
connections are reported to facilitate trade expansion (Lu, 2011), increase the likelihood of 
government bailout (Faccio et al., 2006) and allow firms to pay relatively lower premiums for 
privatization targets (Tu et al., 2013). Campaign contributions are found to increase the 
number of government contracts received (Witko, 2011), the likelihood to participate in 
foreign trade missions (Schuler et al., 2002) and the likelihood of legislators to support 
favourable laws (Liebman & Reynolds, 2006). Lobbying is associated with higher academic 
earmarks (De Figueiredo & Silverman, 2006), antidumping regulations and increased market 
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value of firms (Marsh, 1998). Comments and petitions shift policy towards the preferred 
position of firms (McKay & Webb-Yackee, 2007). The appointment of politicians to 
corporate boards triggers positive stock market reactions (Hillman, 2005). Similarly, 
campaign contributions are positively and significantly related to future abnormal returns 
(Cooper et al., 2010). Peng and Luo (2000) and Imai (2006) posit that political connections 
are positively related to ROA.  
3.3.2 Negative Performance Outcomes  
While majority of the literature found a positive CPA-firm performance relationship, there 
are seven studies which report evidence to the contrary. Using United States data, Aggarwal 
et al. (2011) found that “soft money” donations are negatively correlated with returns. They 
also found that donating firms acquire more and record lower abnormal returns on acquisition 
announcements. Similarly, Hadani and Schuler (2013) reported evidence to suggest that CPA 
has a negative impact on market value. Politically connected firms record poor accounting 
performance after privatization (Boubakri et al., 2008) and after initial public offerings (Fan 
et al., 2007). Connected firms also have poor accruals quality (Chaney et al., 2011) and are 
charged higher interest rates on loans (Bliss & Gul, 2012). Moreover, politicians on boards of 
Italian banks exert a negative impact on interest revenues, loan quality, and capitalization 
level (Carretta et al., 2012). Ties to government add no significant value to firms perhaps due 
to the constraints and costs of political embeddedness (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). 
3.3.3 No Impact and Mixed Outcomes 
Two studies do not find any significant relationship between CPA and firm performance. 
Ansolabehere et al. (2004) found no benefits from campaign donations while Hersch et al. 
(2008) argue that campaign contributions do not create any financial capital. Three studies 
measured multiple outcomes and reported mixed outcomes. According to Faccio et al. 
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(2006), while politically connected firms are able to influence bailout policies to favour them, 
they record poor operating performance. Similarly, Tu et al. (2013) reported that while 
connected firms pay lower premium for quality firms during privatization, they record lower 
operating and stock performance in the post privatization period.  
3.4 Mechanisms Underpinning the CPA-Firm Performance Relationship 
Five theoretical mechanisms through which CPA impacts firm performance are identified in 
the literature. They include resource-based view (RBV) (Barney, 1991), agency (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), resource dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), institutional (Scott, 2005) 
and social capital theories. Some of these mechanisms are explicitly cited while others are 
inferred from the arguments advanced by the studies.  
Social capital is the most frequently used theoretical lens for explaining the outcomes of 
CPA, though it is mostly implied. The establishment of political connections enables firms to 
develop social capital which enables them to extract rent from politicians. These rents are in 
the form of preferential access to finance (Claessens et al., 2008; Yeh et al., 2013) or 
government contracts (Witko, 2011). Social or political capital is more pronounced in 
relationship-based capitalisms (Adhikari et al., 2006; Bliss & Gul, 2012; Fraser et al., 2006) 
where favouritism and cronyism (Johnson & Mitton, 2003) abound. Personal level political 
capital adds value to firms (Sun et al., 2011) and informal connections allow government to 
confer private benefits on firms (Fraser et al., 2006). Campaign contributions also build social 
capital and facilitate access to politicians (Kim, 2008; Witko, 2011). Drawing on RBV, some 
studies argue that the co-optation of politicians into corporate boards adds to the resource 
base of firms (Hillman, 2005) and allows firms to exploit their policy environments (Niessen 
& Ruenzi, 2010). 
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While social capital and RBV theories are mostly associated with the positive outcomes of 
CPA, agency theory is applied to explicate both positive and negative outcomes. For instance, 
Hadani and Schuler (2013) argue that because firms are not required to disclose political 
spending, information asymmetry occurs between managers and shareholders and this leads 
to negative firm performance. They also posit that managers could pursue CPA for self-
aggrandizement. Clearly, this represents a misalignment of interests between managers and 
shareholders. Political connections may create an agency problem where politicians use 
firms’ resources to pursue political and social goals to the detriment of shareholder value 
(Fan et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2012). Political spending may be unprofitable investments which 
add no value to the firm (Ansolabehere et al., 2004; Hersch et al., 2008). On the flipside, 
Jayachandran (2006) suggests that firms target their contributions towards politicians with 
interests aligned to theirs. This ensures that when elected, the politician invariably pursues 
the interests of the firm. In federal agency rule making, firms comment and petition so as to 
make their policy preferences known to regulators and policymakers, and in order to avoid 
litigations agencies revise policy to suit the majority commenters (McKay & Webb-Yackee, 
2007). Politicians on corporate boards may extract rent from firms (Carretta et al., 2012) or 
extend government rents to firms (Hillman, 2005). The entry of business executives into 
politics is motivated by several reasons which include the alignment of interests and rent 
extraction (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009). 
Majority of the studies in emerging and transition economies point to cronyism and 
favouritism (Johnson & Mitton, 2003) and corruption (Khwaja & Mian, 2005) as mechanisms 
through which political connections affect firm performance. Faccio et al. (2006) found that 
the value of political ties is higher in corrupt countries. Similarly, Fisman (2001) argue that 
corruption influences the size of political rents. Poor institutional development results in 
weak systems of checks and balances (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009) and the 
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prevalence of relationship-based capital systems (Fraser et al., 2006) which allow for private 
benefits to be obtained. In China where the government controls many aspects of the stock 
market (Francis et al., 2009) and allocates resources (Peng & Luo, 2000), there is incentive 
for preferential treatment to be accorded to politically connected firms (Wu et al., 2012; Yeh 
et al., 2013). Institutional theory thus underlies most of the CPA studies in developing 
countries. 
Resource dependency posits that firms co-opt external dependencies in order to reduce 
uncertainty (Hillman, 2005). However, the resource dependence logic adopted by the 
literature to explain the mechanism through which CPA impacts performance includes 
another element. Here, the focus is on coercion or the yielding of other market actors to the 
demands of politically connected firms. The dependence of other market actors on 
government makes them yield to political pressures and extend favourable treatment to 
politically connected firms (Faccio et al., 2006). In a study of Pakistani banks, Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) argue that politicians are able to threaten bank officials with transfers, removals, 
or promotions if they do not yield to their demands. This institutional lapse coupled with 
corruption makes politically connected firms have their way with regards to preferential 
lending (Claessens et al., 2008)  and low or no collaterals (Yeh et al., 2013). Interestingly, 
risk reduction is also a mechanism which determines CPA outcomes. Bliss and Gul (2012) 
argue that politically connected firms are charged higher interest rates due to their perceived 
riskiness. This finding is corroborated by Fraser at al. (2006) and Claessens et al. (2008) who 
found that connected firms carry more debt. High leverage increases financial distress and the 
risk of bankruptcy, hence higher interest rates on loans (Bliss & Gul, 2012). 
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4. Discussion 
We find that CPA adds value to firms. It improves stock and operating performance 
(Claessens et al., 2008) and influences policy outcomes (McKay & Webb-Yackee, 2007).  
Indeed, the context within which CPA is done or investigated seems to have an impact on the 
choice of strategy. First, financial strategies involving PAC and “soft money” contributions 
are dominant in the United States. Only a few countries in the world, obviously the developed 
ones, have laws which require that information about donations to political parties and 
candidates are made public (Claessens et al., 2008). All the studies which investigate 
financial strategies are based on United States data with the exception of one (Claessens et 
al., 2008) which is focused on campaign contributions in Brazil. It needs mentioning that 
Brazil is one of those few countries that have laws governing campaign finance.  
In countries with strong legal systems where laws are enacted to guide and control political 
activity, it is relatively easier to observe and gather information on campaign contributions. 
Similarly, in countries where there are laws that govern the rulemaking process, it is easier to 
investigate information strategies. As noted by McKay and Webb-Yackee (2007) for the 
United States, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 requires all agencies to publicly 
publish proposed rules and solicit comments from the public before adopting them. This 
“notice and comment” window (McKay & Webb-Yackee, 2007) provides opportunity for 
firms to influence the final rules (Lo, 2003). On the flip side, such regulations barely exist in 
countries with weak legal systems and this makes it difficult or impossible for firms to use or 
for researchers to study informational strategies in those contexts. It is therefore plausible to 
argue that financial and informational strategies are impacted by the level of institutional 
development.  
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The external environment should stipulate the governance codes of practice to which firms 
must adhere. After all, it is the institutions of the state that moderate the economy (North, 
1990). In emerging or developing countries however, the political institutions have not 
developed well enough to regulate most aspects of the economy, especially the interactions 
between business, government, regulators and the judiciary system. As a result, political 
strategies such as campaign financing and lobbying are not supervised, formalized, or 
institutionalized as we see in developed countries. Without laws governing campaign 
financing and lobbying, the ethicality of CPA becomes questionable. Research has shown 
that legality and transparency are requirements for ethical political behaviours (Gao, 2008; 
Oberman, 2004; Weber, 1997). Even though MNEs are able to play political roles by 
protecting human rights in repressive countries (Crane & Matten, 2007) and reducing social 
ills such as disease and illiteracy (Margolis & Walsh, 2003), they face daunting challenges of 
ensuring ethical political engagement. They need to reduce their political risk exposure in 
emerging countries through CPA, but they also need to gain legitimacy and be perceived as 
ethical even when there are no laws regulating political activity. MNEs therefore need to be 
careful in the governance of their political activity in emerging countries. 
Campaign finance is an important strategy, but relational strategies are perhaps more 
important from our review. We find more studies have explored this nonmarket strategy in 
many different geographical contexts, from developing to developed countries, emerging to 
industrialized countries, and capitalist to transition economies. Whilst these strategies are 
common across the globe, they are more prevalent in emerging countries where institutional 
development is weak and fragile (Wu & Cheng, 2011). The ease with which rents can be 
extracted from political patronage in emerging countries encourages business owners to enter 
politics or firms to connect with politicians for private benefits (Bunkanwanicha & 
Wiwattanakantang, 2009; Fraser et al., 2006; Hassan et al., 2012; Imai, 2006). Wu and Cheng 
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(2011) argue that political connections play a much more important role in emerging markets 
than in developed markets due to the existence of institutional voids in the former (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000).  
In China which is an emerging and transition country, the government plays an important role 
in resource allocation (Peng & Luo, 2000). Owing to the enormous influence of central 
governments and their unpredictability, firms establish relationships to manage the risk 
(Hillman et al., 1999) and to gain access to government controlled resources (Wu & Cheng, 
2011). The literature also cites that political connections, formal and informal, are more 
prevalent in “relationship-based capitalisms” (Fraser et al., 2006) where cronyism and 
personal relationships determine the allocation of capital resources (Johnson & Mitton, 
2003). Malaysia (Adhikari et al., 2006; Bliss & Gul, 2012) and China (Sun et al., 2011) are 
the commonly tagged relationship-based economies. MNEs need to understand that in the 
absence of market supporting structures, social capital underpins the political and economic 
transactions in emerging countries (Peng & Luo, 2000). Hence, the development and 
nurturing of personal level political ties suits this context, but as mentioned earlier the 
challenge comes from public reaction to such connections which are largely fraught in 
corruption.  
<Insert Figure 2> 
Drawing on the IB literature above, we develop Figure 2 to show the different context 
variations and strategies.  Indeed, there seems to be a connection between context and firm 
performance outcomes. Majority of the studies focused on Asia argue that CPA improves 
firm performance. However, two studies (Bliss & Gul, 2012; Fan et al., 2007) reported a 
negative impact of CPA on performance in Malaysia and China. Similarly two studies 
(Aggarwal et al., 2011; Hadani & Schuler, 2013) reported negative outcomes of CPA in the 
28 | P a g e  
 
United States. Two other studies (Ansolabehere et al., 2004; Hersch et al., 2008) found no 
significant impact. In Italy found that political connections have a negative impact on bank 
performance (Carretta et al., 2012). In Brazil however, Claessens et al. (2008) found that 
campaign contributions positively impact stock and operating performances. Going by the 
statistics, a larger proportion of studies in developed countries reported negative or 
insignificant results. The few negative findings in emerging countries could be attributed to 
the loose definitions of political connections by the studies. In developed countries, the 
connections are usually defined by board membership which is typically deeply embedded in 
the fabric of the firms. However, in emerging countries the definition is often loose and 
extends to relations of politicians. In reality, the farther the political connection is away from 
the nexus of political power, the poorer the benefits (Khwaja & Mian, 2005). 
The mixed findings across different countries suggest that institutional characteristics could 
have a bearing on CPA outcomes. Multiple-country studies report evidence to support this 
claim. In countries with limited stock market development, fragile democracies, high 
corruption, and controlled press, there are better opportunities for CPA to yield substantive 
gains (Boubakri et al., 2012). MNEs in developing countries should therefore have the 
imperative to develop their political capabilities for two obvious reasons – risk reduction and 
superior competitive advantage. In deciding where to expand or the destination of foreign 
direct investment, MNEs may consider countries which receive assistance from The World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The likelihood of government bailout in such 
countries (Faccio et al., 2006) may not extend to foreign firms, but this guarantee for the local 
firms reduces risk levels in the business environment and provides some insurance against 
any disruptions of the value chain.  
Figure 3 shows the continental distribution of the reviewed literature, and the performance 
outcome directions (+ for positive; - for negative; O for no impact). 
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<Insert Figure 3>  
Interestingly, all IB and economics based studies investigating policy performance found that 
CPA is able to influence policy decisions in ways favourable to the firm. For instance, 
contributions influence senate roll call vote (Liebman & Reynolds, 2006; Mian, Sufi, & 
Trebbi, 2010; Steagall & Jennings, 1996) while political connections shape government 
subsidy decisions (Lee & Baik, 2010; Wu & Cheng, 2011) and protect firms from 
competition (Evans & Sherlund, 2011). It is therefore plausible to argue based on the 
literature that informational strategies and any other strategies targeted at policy influence are 
usually successful. To prevent negative perceptions of corrupt corporate governance arising 
from unregulated campaign contributions in emerging countries, MNEs may develop deep 
knowledge of their business areas and create effective public affairs functions (Doh et al., 
2014) capable of producing accurate and trustworthy petitions. Beside petitions being a 
formal procedure and hence posing no legitimacy risk, they are also mostly successful in 
influencing policy outcomes.   
The contribution of this paper to IB scholarship is that institutional frameworks influence 
organizational behaviour and affect the strategic choices firms must make (North, 1990; 
Oliver, 1991; Peng, 2003; Suddaby, 2010), and in this case the CPA choices of MNEs. The 
central theme of this argument may resonate with institutional isomorphism whereby 
institutional forces compel firms to comply and seek homogeneity with existing conditions 
and other actors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For legitimacy reasons, MNEs may come under 
severe pressure to follow the rules and observe the norms in host countries (Scott, 2005), but 
they are also capable of acting as institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988) in developing 
countries where they can play global governance roles by transferring best principles and 
rules of political engagement from home to host country. Already, MNEs are playing key 
roles in ensuring human rights (Crane & Matten, 2007; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). There is 
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room for MNEs from home countries where CPA is regulated to push for similar laws in 
emerging countries. Countries such as the U.S, Germany, and U.K are homes to most of the 
MNEs which operate in developing countries. Rules of business-government relations and 
corporate citizenship (Moon et al., 2005) in these developed countries could be transferred to 
resolve the anarchical nature of political engagement in emerging countries. Experiences in 
their home countries could be brought to bear on the policy arena in developing countries. 
4.1 Mapping the CIMO-logic of CPA-Firm Performance 
Having teased out the themes of the CIMO-logic, it is time to bring it all together to derive 
the whole picture. More importantly, we define our contribution again, to show how we add 
to the CPA field and more broadly to the IB arena.  Firstly, using the CIMO-logic, we show 
that the common strategy in developing countries is the relational strategy where firms 
establish connections with politicians, which can be a liability or an advantage. In developed 
countries, financial and informational strategies are popular. Perhaps, this is because 
developed countries have laws that regulate political spending and the policymaking process, 
allowing firms to participate in political and policy issues. Relational strategies affect 
performance outcomes mainly through the acquisition of social capital (Sun et al., 2011; Wu 
et al., 2012), the use of force (Khwaja & Mian, 2005), the exploitation of institutional lapses 
or through corruption (Johnson & Mitton, 2003). Note that these mechanisms are popular in 
relationship-based capital systems (Adhikari et al., 2006) where institutional development is 
weak. The pressure on other firms to yield to the demands of politicians and politically 
connected firms is much stronger in emerging countries (Faccio et al., 2006; Khwaja & Mian, 
2005). Owing to poor institutions, policy outcomes are not investigated in emerging 
countries. Firms in these countries have a little chance to influence the formulation of policy. 
In developed countries however, the presence of checks and balances reduces the probability 
of governments to exercise undue power over firms. Firms are given the opportunity to 
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comment on proposals, green papers and white papers. Drawing on evidence from the 
literature, we capture the CIMO-logic of CPA in Figure 4.  
<Insert Figure 4> 
The paucity of IB studies about informational strategies in emerging countries could be a sign 
that corporations are not doing much to leave footprints on the policy landscape. This could 
be the result of poor institutional development which makes it difficult for firms to participate 
in the policy process. However corporations, especially MNEs, will have to invoke their 
institutional entrepreneurship to positively prevail upon the fragile political institutions in 
emerging countries.  
5. Conclusion and Future Agenda 
In conclusion, the investigation of IB studies and other important studies in economics, 
finance and political science, on the relationship between CPA and firm performance reveals 
that there is a general view that CPA impacts firm performance positively. Going by the 
empirical evidence from this review, suffice to argue that the advocacy for nonmarket 
strategy (Baron, 1995) and CPA (Lawton et al., 2013) is justified. The findings corroborate 
other studies (Bonardi, Holburn, & Bergh, 2006; Capron & Chatain, 2008; McWilliams et al., 
2002) which suggest that nonmarket action adds value to firms, and strengthens Bernhagen 
and Brauninger’s (2005) the claim that policy decisions are positively skewed towards 
business interests. However, there are few studies which report evidence to the contrary 
(Bliss & Gul, 2012; Fan et al., 2007; Hadani & Schuler, 2013). It is therefore not surprising 
that our understanding of CPA outcomes remains incomplete and inconclusive (Hadani & 
Schuler, 2013). 
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What strikes clearly from the literature is the influence of context on the strategies used by 
firms and the type of outcomes CPA can achieve. In emerging countries, relational strategies 
are commonly used and the targeted outcomes are mostly operating and stock performances. 
Social capital from informal ties with politicians is about the most valuable political asset a 
firm can ever have in emerging countries. Policy change does not seem to be a feasible 
project for firms in developing countries where political institutions are yet to fully 
incorporate the opinions of the private sector in the policy making process. We understand 
that favours and preferential treatment often times result in corruption and cronyism (Imai, 
2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003), but are the channels of superior performance for firms in 
these countries. 
Our findings have implications for managers, especially those of MNEs. First, foreign firms 
in emerging countries face greater environmental risks (Puck et al., 2013) owing to the 
volatility and fragility of the institutions in these countries (Luo, 2004). According to Henisz 
and Zelner (2003), the absence of checks and balances in these countries make them high 
risk. Hence firms in these high risk environments would have to indulge in CPA to reduce 
their exposure to uncertainty (Meznar & Nigh, 1995). However, not every strategy works in 
every institutional context. Similarly, not every outcome is easy or possible to achieve in 
every context. Relational strategies seem to work best in emerging countries, but more 
research needs to explore the liabilities of these networks over time. Social capital, with its 
attendant benefits, proves to be the value-adding resource in the developing world. Though 
policy may seem difficult to influence in emerging countries due to reasons already discussed 
earlier, firms which are able to get involved in the policy process are more likely to be 
successful. The difficulty would be access to the policy making machinery. On a general 
note, CPA improves performance. It is therefore worth it for managers of local firms and 
MNEs alike to invest in corporate political engagement. MNEs need to consider the 
33 | P a g e  
 
institutional environment of host countries when deciding political engagement. They also 
need to strengthen their capabilities to act as institutional entrepreneurs in emerging countries 
where they can help develop the fragile institutions in these countries by transferring and 
advocating CPA best practices. Their contribution to global governance is as important as 
that of the Bretton-Woods institutions. 
As much as the thematic analysis of the reviewed literature has improved our knowledge of 
the CPA-firm performance relationship, it has also facilitated the identification of gaps in the 
extant literature with respect to contexts, interventions/strategies, mechanisms, and outcomes 
of CPA. Consequently, we propose the following significant avenues for future research.  
The CPA literature body is replete with studies on antecedents (Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; 
Hersch & McDougall, 2000; Hillman, 2003; Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton, Rajwani, & Doh, 
2013), strategies (Keim & Zeithaml, 1986) and conceptions/theory (Boddewyn & Brewer, 
1994; Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; Capron & Chatain, 2008; 
Hillman & Keim, 1995). However, the outcomes of CPA are among the least studied (Lux et 
al., 2011). There are many theories that explain why firms engage in CPA or why firms 
conduct CPA in particular ways (Getz, 1997), but only a few have been applied to explain 
CPA outcomes. One theory that is popular with research in emerging and developing 
countries is institutional theory. Evidence from this review suggests that the outcomes of 
CPA may vary with different institutional contexts (Hillman, 2005; Wu & Cheng, 2011; Wu 
et al., 2012). Meanwhile a scrutiny of the geographic distribution of studies on the outcomes 
of CPA reveals that some regions, especially Australia and Africa, remain unexplored. Future 
studies could examine the impact of CPA on firm performance in Africa which has a unique 
institutional environment. In a similar vein, the impact of CPA on MNE performance in 
emerging and developing countries could be a significant avenue for future research. 
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Studies do not examine financial and informational strategies in developing countries. Most 
of these strategies are focused on United States, except one study (Claessens et al., 2008) 
which examines political spending in Brazil. There are two possible explanations for this 
observation: 1) it could be the case that studies have intentionally or unintentionally 
overlooked these strategies in the emerging markets contexts or 2) these strategies are not 
used by firms in developing countries. It is however difficult to accept the latter since 
everywhere in the world corporations seem to play a role in politics. Following from that 
premise, we propose that future research could investigate financial and informational 
strategies in emerging countries but also what the antecedents of these strategies are and how 
they are deployed. If there is a view that these strategies are invisible or non-existent in the 
developing world context, future studies could explore how contextual or institutional 
configurations influence the choice of CPA strategies. As emerging countries promise to be 
attractive to IB scholars (Doh et al., 2012), this sort of focus would be useful for 
multinationals, especially in terms of market entry research.    
While the linkage between context, strategies and performance outcomes are clear in the 
literature, the theoretical mechanisms through which these strategies exert their influence on 
firm performance outcomes are less clear. The explicit adoption of a theoretical framing for 
explaining the performance outcomes of CPA is largely missing. It therefore seems that the 
literature is biased about answering the “what” but not the “how” questions with respect to 
the outcomes of CPA. Explicating the mechanisms through which CPA affects firm 
performance will deepen understanding of the topic (Adhikari et al., 2006; Dean, Vryza, & 
Fryxell, 1998; Hillman et al., 1999), but this is missed by the literatures. Thus, future IB 
studies could fill this gap using multiple indicators to better understand outcomes. 
The outcomes of CPA have been measured in very different ways. Most studies examine 
stock performance (Cooper et al., 2010; Goldman et al., 2009; Huber & Kirchler, 2013) and 
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operating performance (Carretta et al., 2012; Chaney et al., 2011; Claessens et al., 2008). 
There are some others which examine academic earmarks (De Figueiredo & Silverman, 
2006), anti-dumping proceeds (Lee & Baik, 2010), government contracts (Witko, 2011), 
bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006), trade mission participation (Schuler et al., 2002) and 
regulations (McKay & Webb-Yackee, 2007). It is thus evident that CPA outcomes have been 
examined using different variables and constructs, but there is still room for the impact of 
CPA on other performance metrics to be investigated (Lux et al., 2011). Future studies could 
examine how CPA impacts restrictions on pricing or mark ups and import or export licensing. 
Future studies could also examine industry entry restrictions by measuring how long it takes 
MNEs to obtain operating licenses. 
Our review also reveals that empirical studies address corporate involvement in the political 
process mainly at the national level. While it is at this level that most of CPA can be seen, it 
still does not rule out the fact that CPA exists at the local/regional/state/supranational levels. 
For instance, in the United States majority of the studies focus on national politics to the 
neglect of State politics, yet State governments have authority to enact laws and pass 
regulations which can affect different types of firms. Similarly in developing countries, local 
governments have the authority to set tolls and tax rates. These instances also highlight a 
significant research opportunity to investigate the CPA of small firms which may not have 
the resources or capabilities to participate in national-level politics. They may use other forms 
of nepotism to influence governments for grants or tax benefits.  
Finally, surveys are used less in CPA empirical studies. In this review, only two studies (Lu, 
2011; Peng & Luo, 2000) use this approach. While surveys could be used to obtain unique 
datasets for unique constructs, they could also be used to collect information which is not 
public. Outside this review, we have found recent work by White et al. (2014) who use these 
techniques effectively. Drawing on their ideas, future researchers could use more of these 
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survey techniques in ways that allow for novel constructs to be developed at a multi-level i.e. 
CPA performance constructs like ‘perceived performance’ at individual, team, business unit 
and organizational levels in parallel to regional, national and international levels.  Indeed, the 
CPA field and theories in this growing domain have fruitful research opportunities. We hope 
our ideas shed light on them for future IB scholars, especially as this world becomes more 
multi-polar in terms of power shifts from west to east. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Quality Appraisal Tool 
Code Criteria 
 Theoretical framework and development of hypotheses 
A Are the study’s propositions and hypotheses clearly articulated? 
B Are the basic arguments of the paper important and interesting? 
C Are important premises and assumptions identified? 
D Are the key terms defined? 
 Description and evaluation of methods 
E Is the methodology of the paper clearly identified? 
F Are data collection methods described adequately? 
G Are the sampling strategy and sample explained? 
H Is the operationalization of the variables and the constructs plausible (content validity)? 
I Are dependent and control variables identified and described? 
J Do measures theoretically relate to independent and dependent variables (construct validity)? 
K Are questionnaire or other instrument items identified and described? 
L Have steps been taken to avoid data collection errors? 
M Is there evidence of reliability or internal consistency in the study? 
 Results 
N Are the findings adequately and accurately described? 
O Are the results related back to original propositions, hypothesis, research question, and data 
analysis? 
P Do tables provide sufficient and accurate data to allow reader to reach independent 
conclusions? 
Q Is implied causality justified? 
R Has the author adequately considered alternative explanations for the results? 
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Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
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Appendix D: CIMO Framework for Selected Studies 
  
Adhikari 
et al. 
(2006) 
Aggarwal 
et al. 
(2011) 
Ansolabehere 
et al. (2004) 
Bliss 
and 
Gul 
(2012) 
Boubakri 
et al. 
(2012) 
Boubakri 
et al. 
(2008) 
Boubakri 
et al. 
(2012) 
Brown 
(1996) 
Bunkanwanicha 
and 
Wiwattanakantang 
(2009) 
Carretta 
et al. 
(2012) 
Chaney 
et al. 
(2011) 
Claessens 
et al. 
(2008) 
Cooper 
et al. 
(2010) 
de 
Figueiredo 
and 
Silverman 
(2006) 
Dean et 
al. 
(1998) 
Context                               
Globalization & Competition 
  X X   X   X     X X   X X X 
Uncertainty & Risk 
                              
Regulation 
                  X         X 
Economic transition & Privatization 
          X                   
Weak institutional environments X     X         X     X       
Political Transition 
              X               
Management change 
                              
Strategy/Intervention 
                              
Financial (PAC/Political 
contributions/Soft money) 
  X X         X       X X X X 
Relational (Politically connected 
boards/CEOs/Top Management Teams) X     X   X X   X X X     X   
Informational (Petitions/Comments) 
                              
Mechanism implied by theory 
                              
Changes in resources and capabilities 
(resourced based view theory) 
                              
Mis/alignment of business and political 
interests; un/profitable investment; 
managerial self-aggrandizement  
(agency theory) 
  X X   X X X       X   X X   
Co-optation of external dependencies; 
yielding to dependencies (resource 
dependency theory) 
        X         X           
Corruption & Cronyism; changes to 
institutional barriers (institutional 
theory) X     X   X           X       
Preferential treatment; influence and 
access to government (social 
capital/network theory) X     X X X   X X     X     X 
Outcomes 
                              
Stock performance 
  X X       X X X     X X     
Operating/Accounting performance X     X X X       X X X       
Policy influence 
                          X X 
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Evans and 
Sherlund 
(2011) 
Faccio 
(2006) 
Faccio et 
al. 
(2006) Fan et 
al. 
(2007) 
Fisman 
(2001) 
Francis et 
al. (2009) 
Fraser et 
al. 
(2006) 
Goldman 
et al. 
(2009) 
Hadani 
and 
Schuler 
(2013) 
Hassan et 
al. (2012) 
Hersch et 
al. (2008) 
Hillman 
et al. 
(1999) 
Hillman 
(2005) 
Huber and 
Kirchler 
(2013) 
Imai 
(2006) 
Context 
                              
Globalization & Competition X X X         X     X X X X   
Uncertainty & Risk 
  X             X     X X     
Regulation X               X     X X     
Economic transition & Privatization 
      X X X                   
Weak institutional environments 
      X   X X     X         X 
Political Transition 
                              
Management change 
                              
Strategy/Intervention 
                              
Financial (PAC/Political contributions/Soft 
money) X               X   X     X   
Relational (Politically connected 
boards/CEOs/Top Management Teams) 
  X X X   X X X X X   X X   X 
Informational (Petitions/Comments) 
                              
Mechanism implied by theory 
                              
Changes in resources and capabilities 
(resourced based view theory) 
                    X X X     
Mis/alignment of business and political 
interests; un/profitable investment; 
managerial self-aggrandizement  (agency 
theory) 
  X X X       X X X           
Co-optation of external dependencies; 
yielding to dependencies (resource 
dependency theory) 
  X             X     X X     
Corruption & Cronyism; changes to 
institutional barriers (institutional theory) 
  X     X   X               X 
Preferential treatment; influence and access 
to government (social capital/network 
theory) X X X     X X             X X 
Outcomes 
                              
Stock performance 
  X   X X X   X X X X X X X   
Operating/Accounting performance 
    X X     X   X X     X   X 
Policy influence X   X                         
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Jayachandran 
(2006) 
Johnson 
and 
Mitton 
(2003) 
Khwaja 
and 
Mian 
(2005) 
Kim 
(2008) 
Lee 
and 
Baik 
(2010) 
Leuz and 
Oberholzer-
Gee (2006) 
Liebman 
and 
Reynolds 
(2006) 
Lo 
(2003) 
Lu 
(2011) 
Marsh 
(1998) 
Mathur 
and Singh 
(2011) 
McGuire 
et al. 
(1988) 
McKay 
and 
Webb-
Yackee 
(2007) 
Mian et 
al. (2010) 
Niessen 
and 
Ruenzi 
(2010) 
Context 
                              
Globalization & Competition 
        X   X   X X X   X   X 
Uncertainty & Risk 
                              
Regulation 
  X   X X   X X   X     X X   
Economic transition & Privatization 
                              
Weak institutional environments 
  X X     X                   
Political Transition X                             
Management change 
                      X       
Strategy/Intervention 
                              
Financial (PAC/Political 
contributions/Soft money) X     X X   X       X     X   
Relational (Politically connected 
boards/CEOs/Top Management Teams) 
  X X     X           X     X 
Informational (Petitions/Comments) 
              X   X     X     
Mechanism implied by theory 
                              
Changes in resources and capabilities 
(resourced based view theory) 
                      X       
Mis/alignment of business and political 
interests; un/profitable investment; 
managerial self-aggrandizement  (agency 
theory) X     X X     X   X X   X   X 
Co-optation of external dependencies; 
yielding to dependencies (resource 
dependency theory) 
            X                 
Corruption & Cronyism; changes to 
institutional barriers (institutional theory) 
  X X     X     X             
Preferential treatment; influence and 
access to government (social 
capital/network theory) X X X   X X           X   X   
Outcomes 
                              
Stock performance X X   X   X   X   X   X     X 
Operating/Accounting performance 
    X         X X   X       X 
Policy influence 
        X   X           X X   
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Peng and Luo 
(2000) 
Richter et al. 
(2009) 
Schuler et al. 
(2002) 
Steagall and 
Jennings 
(1996) 
Sun et al. 
(2011) 
Tu et al. 
(2013) 
Witko 
(2011) 
Wu and 
Cheng 
(2011) 
Wu et al. 
(2012) 
Wu et al. 
(2012) 
Yeh et al. 
(2013) 
Context 
                      
Globalization & Competition 
  X X X   X X         
Uncertainty & Risk 
                      
Regulation 
  X   X       X       
Economic transition & Privatization X       X X   X   X   
Weak institutional environments 
          X   X X     
Political Transition 
                    X 
Management change 
                      
Strategy/Intervention 
                      
Financial (PAC/Political contributions/Soft money) 
  X X X     X         
Relational (Politically connected boards/CEOs/Top 
Management Teams) X       X X   X X X X 
Informational (Petitions/Comments) 
                      
Mechanism implied by theory 
                      
Changes in resources and capabilities (resourced based 
view theory) X             X X     
Mis/alignment of business and political interests; 
un/profitable investment; managerial self-
aggrandizement  (agency theory) 
            X   X X   
Co-optation of external dependencies; yielding to 
dependencies (resource dependency theory) X     X       X       
Corruption & Cronyism; changes to institutional barriers 
(institutional theory) 
          X           
Preferential treatment; influence and access to 
government (social capital/network theory) X X X   X X X X   X X 
Outcomes 
                      
Stock performance 
        X X     X X X 
Operating/Accounting performance X X       X     X X X 
Policy influence 
    X X     X X       
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Figure 1 Conceptual Framework for Investigating CPA-Firm Performance Relationship 
Table 1 Search Strings 
No. Search Theme String 
1 Financial CPA 
Strategies and Firm 
Performance 
(“political action committee” OR “PAC contributions” or 
“politic* donat*” OR “campaign contribution” OR “political 
contribution” OR “corporate politic* invest*” OR “soft 
money”) AND (Benefits OR “firm performance” OR 
performance OR value OR returns OR outcome OR effect* OR 
success* OR impact) 
 
    
2 Relational CPA 
Strategies and Firm 
Performance 
(“politic* connect*” OR “politic* ties” OR “politic* link*” OR 
“politically connected boards” OR “business-government 
relations”) AND (Benefits OR “firm performance” OR 
performance OR value OR returns OR outcome OR effect* OR 
success* OR impact) 
     
3 Informational CPA 
Strategies and Firm 
Performance 
(lobby* w/5 (corporate OR firm)) AND (Benefits OR “firm 
performance” OR performance OR value OR returns OR 
outcome OR effect* OR success* OR impact) 
 
 
Context 
 Competition and 
Globalization 
 Regulation 
 Uncertainty and 
Risk 
 Economic 
transition and 
Privatization 
 Weak 
Institutional 
environments 
 Political 
transition 
 Management 
Change 
 
Interventions 
Political Strategies 
 Financial 
Strategies (PAC 
and “soft 
money” 
contributions 
 Relational 
Strategies 
(political 
connections) 
 Informational 
Strategies 
(lobbying, 
petitions, 
comments) 
Mechanisms 
 Resource-based 
view theory 
 Agency theory 
 Resource 
dependency 
theory 
 Institutional 
theory 
 Social capital 
 Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcomes 
 Stock 
performance 
 Operating 
performance 
 Policy 
performance 
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Table 2 Results for Search Strings per Database 
Search String ABI/Inform EBSCO 
Business 
Source 
Complete 
Total for 
Search String 
Total after 
elimination of 
duplicates per 
string 
String 1 72 105 177 153 
String 2 1,456 974 2429 2295 
String 3 107 50 152 135 
Totals 1,630 1,128 2,758 2,583 
Total search results after elimination of duplicates 2,454* 
 
Table 3 Selection Process 
Title 
Screening 
 Started with 2,454 articles after removing all duplicates 
 
 1,523 titles related to entirely different research areas such as public-private 
partnerships, NGOs, Development, Capital Control, etc. Examples of titles 
include: “Reasons for implementing public private partnership projects”, 
“Stakeholder management for public private partnerships”, “Investments in 
rent-seeking”, “Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to 
Crisis”, “The influence of UK NGOs on the common agricultural policy” 
 668 titles related to the research area but did not relate or refer to the review 
question. These titles related to the types and determinants of political strategies, 
and to political organization for lobbying. Some examples of such titles include: 
“Were lobbyists on income tax accounting influenced by income strategies?”, 
“Who Gave Soft Money? The Effect of Interest Group Resources on Political 
Contributions”, “Competition and political organization: Together or alone in 
lobbying for trade policy?”, “Firm-level determinants of political influence”, 
“Constituency building as the foundation for corporate political strategy”, “Are 
firms' lobbying strategies universal? Comparison of lobbying by French and UK 
firms” 
  2 articles were eliminated because they related to state/municipal lobbying and 
not corporate level political activity. Example: “Fiscal Federalism, State 
Lobbying and Discretionary Finance: Evidence from India” 
 In total, 2,193 papers were eliminated because they didn’t address the review 
question 
Abstract 
Screening 
 Started with 261 articles after title screening 
 58 articles were eliminated because they related to different research areas 
 89 were eliminated because they related to the research area but did not address 
the research question. Examples include: “Latino Political Connectedness and 
Electoral Participation”, “Political Connections: The Missing Dimension in 
Leadership”, “The Contingent Value of Corporate Political Ties” 
 A total of 147 articles were eliminated, retaining 114 articles.  
Full text 
Screening 
 Started with 141 articles (114 from databases, 25 from cross-referencing, and 2 
from recommendations by supervisor) 
 67 articles from the databases and 5 from cross-referencing were eliminated 
because they were not related to the research question. These papers focused on 
state enterprises, political strategies and antecedents of CPA. Others were 
conceptual, or did not address a specific political strategy. Examples of titles 
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include: “High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst 
forecast accuracy around the world”, “Cross-border political donations and 
Pareto-efficient tariffs”, Firm Level Performance Implications of Nonmarket 
Actions 
 A total of 72 articles were excluded at this stage, retaining 69 articles.  
Quality 
Screening 
 Quality screening was conducted for 69 articles 
 13 articles ( 2 from cross-referencing and 11 from the databases) were 
eliminated due to issues with methodology and trustworthiness 
 The final sample contained 56 articles (18 from cross-referencing, 2 from 
recommendations, and 36 from the databases) 
 
Table 4 Definitions of Political Connections 
Study Definition of Political Connection 
Adhikari et al. (2006) 
"a firm's directors or major shareholders have informal ties with 
leading politicians through personal encounters" 
Boubakri et al. (2012) 
“a company is politically-connected if at least one member of its 
board of directors (BOD) or its supervisory board is or was a 
politician, that is, a member of parliament, a minister or any other 
top appointed-bureaucrat” 
Chaney et al. (2011) 
“A company is classified as politically connected if, at some point 
between 1997 and 2001, at least one of its large shareholders 
(anybody directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of votes) or 
top directors (CEO, chairman of the board, president, vice-
president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister or a 
head of state, or is tightly related to a politician or party.” 
Faccio et al. (2006) 
“a company is defined as politically connected if at least one of its 
top officers (defined as the company’s chief executive officer, 
chairman of the board (COB), president, vice-president, or 
secretary of the board) or a large shareholder (defined as anyone 
controlling at least 10% of the company’s voting shares) was head 
of state (i.e., president, king, or prime minister), a government 
minister (as defined below), or a member of the national 
parliament, as of the beginning of 1997.” 
Faccio (2006) 
“a company is connected with a politician if one of the company’s 
large shareholders or top officers is: (a) a member of parliament 
(MP), (b) a minister or the head of state, or (c) closely related to a 
top official.” 
Hassan et al. (2012) Firms linked to the prime minister and deputy prime minister 
Sun et al. (2011) 
Firms with "ownership ties to the Shanghai government and board 
members with career experience in municipal government" 
Wu et al. (2012) 
“We define a CEO as politically connected if he or she is currently 
serving or formerly served in the government or military.” 
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Yeh (2013) 
“(1) the firm was founded or run by the political party; (2) the 
political party is one of the firm's large shareholders; (3) the 
chairman or CEO publicly supports the presidential candidate 
representing a certain political party, participates in or has his/her 
employees participate in the presidential campaign or was 
described by at least one major newspaper as being supportive of a 
certain political party; and (4) one of the firm's large shareholders, 
directors or top officers is/was a member of parliament, a minister 
or a top government official” 
 
Table 5 Performance Outcome Constructs and Variables 
Outcome Construct Variable(s) Key Studies 
Access to finance leverage, interest rates 
Claessens et al. (2008); Yeh et al. (2012); 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) 
Trade expansion Sales Lu (2011) 
Operating performance 
ROA, ROE, ROI, ETR, 
interest revenues, debt 
maturity, acquisition 
premium, interest rates 
Peng and Luo (2000); Bliss and Gul 
(2012); Richter et al. (2009); Mathur and 
Singh (2011) 
Stock performance 
CARs, BHARs, Cost of 
equity 
Hillman (2005); Cooper et al. (2010); 
Boubakri et al. (2012b); Goldman et al. 
(2010); Hadani and Schuler (2013) 
Policy and Quasi 
Policy Performance 
Government contracts Witko (2011) 
Anti-dumping proceeds Lee and Baik (2010) 
Trade mission 
participation Schuler et al. (2002a) 
Roll call voting 
Liebman and Reynolds (2006); 
McKay and Webb-Yackee (2007) 
Government bailout Faccio et al. (2006) 
Academic earmarks De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Impact of Context on Strategy Selection 
 
Context: Transition economies, 
Emerging economies, weak 
institutions, Poor policymaking rules 
Dominant Strategy/Intervention: 
Relational Strategies 
 
Context: Developed countries, 
Strong institutions, Clear 
CPA/Policymaking rules 
Dominant Strategy/Intervention: 
Financial and Informational 
Strategies 
Overarching Context: 
Competition and 
Globalization 
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Figure 3 Geographic Distribution of Performance Outcome Directions 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Empirically Derived CIMO Framework of CPA 
 
Emerging/Developing Countries 
 
Developed Countries 
Relational 
Strategies Financial 
Strategies 
Informational 
Strategies 
• Social capital 
• Coercion 
• Corruption Alignment of firm and 
government interests 
• Operating Performance 
• Stock Performance 
• Operating Performance 
• Stock Performance 
• Policy performance 
